In the April 11th issue of The New Republic, Martin Peretz (“The Politics of Churlishness”) takes liberals to task for what he sees as their inability to show even grudging respect for President Bush’s recent successes in the Middle East. Sadly, Peretz reads too much into the supposed triumph of the Bush Doctrine, while not reading enough into the liberal critique of it.

For starters, most liberals, like most Americans, are genuinely pleased with the turn of events in Iraq, Afghanistan and Lebanon, among other places. They do not “deny and resent and begrudge and snipe” at the prospect of revolutionary social and political change on the ground in the region. Instead, the overwhelming reaction among those left of center, whether they supported the Iraq war or not, is a mixture of exhilaration and relief.

As with the administration’s proponents, the breathless pride of liberals comes from the spectacle writ large of Arab and Muslim populations making democratic transformation possible by braving bullets in Baghdad, casting ballots in Kabul, and demonstrating against Damascus in Lebanon. The deep feeling of relief that most Americans share, however, is the United States may succeed and our troops may be able to come home in spite of, and not because of, the Bush administration...[MORE]

Continue reading "Martin Peretz: New Republican"

On this key point, Peretz’s caustic history suffers from selective amnesia. One the one hand, he issues a stinging rebuke to the Clinton administration both for what he sees as its tepid response to Al Qaeda attacks and its ill-advised engagement in a peace process with the Palestinians he could never accept. Yet he is largely silent on the Bush administration’s complete lack of focus on the Al Qaeda threat, that is, “until, of course, a catastrophe in Lower Manhattan concentrated its mind.” As Richard Clarke, the 9/11 commission members, and Donald Rumsfeld’s 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review all show, at the very time Bin Laden was “determined to strike in the U.S.”, President Bush was determined to preparing a smaller army and a missile shield for dual regional enemies: North Korea and Iraq.

Peretz also accepts at face value George Bush’s 2004 campaign statement that the United States was the victim of “catastrophic success” in Iraq. The problem, of course, was not that we won too quickly, but that the administration made a series of calamitous choices before and after its poorly planned invasion. Ignoring General Shinseki’s warnings on needed occupation troop levels and heeding Paul Bremer’s call to disband the Iraqi army were a recipe for chaos for the undersized U.S. contingent and provided the opportunity for the nascent insurgency. And President Bush’s utter inability to draw support from the international community meant the virtually the entire cost - and the casualties - for the Iraq invasion would be borne by Americans.

Looking at the Orange, Purple Finger and Cedar revolutions, Peretz casually acknowledges, “there were lucky breaks.” But that string of good fortune constitutes the necessary condition for the success of Bush’s vision of democracy promotion. For example, Peretz praises Bush’s refusal to deal with Yassir Arafat, an approach constituted not a policy, but a temper tantrum. Afraid and unwilling to commit his prestige to the Clinton peace process, Bush sat on his hands as the intifada festered, thousands died, and the Israeli-Palestinian powder keg threatened to explode. It was only when “the angel of death unilaterally attacked Arafat” that the Bush administration was saved from a failure of historic proportions. In Iraq, Peretz’s benevolent angel took the form of Ayatollah Al-Sistani, whose 2004 insistence on direct elections ultimately provided the legitimacy for the January 2005 voting. The fortuitous combination of the death of Arafat, Viktor Yushchenko's dioxin-tainted soup, bungling Syrian intelligence agents, and an all-powerful Shi'ite cleric may have snatched victory from the jaws of defeat for Bush. In large part, it appears to be serendipity, not strategy, which has been the engine of democratic reform in that part of the world.

It would be “simply stupid,” Peretz proclaims, “to deny that all or any of this would have happened without the deeply unpopular but historically grand initiative of Bush.” But which “grand initiative” would that be? As I wrote in “The Myth of the Bush Doctrine,” the so-called Bush Doctrine has morphed over time as conditions on the ground and political expediency required. Its three pillars - no safe havens, preventive war, and democracy expansion - did not magically emerge with a puff of smoke from the White House on September 12, 2001. The centrality of democracy promotion, a footnote in the President’s pre-war rhetoric, did not come in earnest until the Second Inaugural. The absence of Saddam’s weapons of mass destruction completely undermined the President’s primary Iraq war rationale as the growing insurgency imperiled American objectives there. Thus, we have the ex post facto Bush Doctrine: we did not invade Iraq to promote democracy; we promote democracy because we invaded Iraq.

So where does this leave us? No doubt in much better shape than a year ago, as virtually all Americans left and right would agree. But the improving situation in the Middle East has come at a steep price. Beyond blood and treasure, American alliances are in tatters and the U.S. reservoir of “soft power” has been drained by the dramatic in fall in global opinion of the United States. Exacerbating matters, the Silberman-Robb report on U.S. intelligence failings in Iraq, Iran and North Korea critically impaired the legitimacy of future American preventive actions. And the opportunity cost may be steeper still. While we of necessity grind through in Iraq, off the Bush radar screen, nuclear threats proliferate, Chinese power expands, the EU alternative gains steam, and new economic rivals like India emerge.

Unfortunately for the United States, Bush’s Middle East progress does not reflect prescience, and his vindication does not necessarily mean victory. Saved by Sistani, prodded by Putin, urged by Ukraine, assisted by Arafat and aided by Assad, Bush shows once again that it is better to be lucky than good.

Alas, it is not President Bush’s Middle East successes liberals begrudge, but his hubris. As Jim Hightower would say, President Bush is a man who was born on third base and then tells everyone he hit a triple.

—Perrspective 3:31 PM | Permalink | Comments (1) |