What Is To Be Done: A 10-Point Plan for Iraq
The debate over the American debacle in Iraq sounds more and more like the Fram oil filter ads from the 1970's. In those spots, a hard-nosed mechanic tells consumers, "you can pay me now or pay me later." The inevitable result of the current political dialogue over Iraq will be the "Fram choice" for Americans: the United States can lose now or lose later.
On the right, President Bush and his fellow travelers refuse to accept accountability for selling a war that a majority of Americans view as a mistake. The administration and its amen corner refuse to deviate from a failed strategy that has produced a security nightmare and economic devastation, while maintaining the fictional linkage between 9/11 and Iraq.
Many on the left, swept up in the emotion of Cindy Sheehan's crusade, are calling for an immediate withdrawl from Iraq that could produce the next Somalia or worse, the next Afghanistan.
Meanwhile, confusion reigns on Capitol Hill. Republican Senator John McCain and Democratic Senator Joe Biden, seeing the rising chaos and porous Iraqi borders, have called for sending more troops. A House group led by Republican Walter "Freedom Fries" Jones (R-NC) is proposing a joint resolution calling for a presidential commitment this year to bringing the troops home starting October 1, 2006. And Senator Russell Feingold (D-WI) has called for withdrawing all U.S. troops by the end of 2006.
The key question for the United States is no longer Cindy Sheehan's "why did my son die for?" but "what is to be done now?" With rising U.S. casualties, an emboldened insurgency, American credibility in tatters and no end in sight, any plan forward must define what, at this late date, can be said to constitute "success" in Iraq and whether or not success so defined is still be possible. If not, and if American defeat is inevitable, we should cut our losses begin to withdraw now.
Salvaging Iraq, I believe, will be difficult, but not impossible. To win back the confidence both of the American people and the international community, we must be frank about past mistakes. More importantly, to have any hope of "winning" in Iraq, the United States must be crystal clear about the conflict's objectives and brutally honest about the sacrifices required. Short of that, the American effort in Iraq is doomed - it will only be a question of when.
Here, then, is Perrspectives' 10-Point Plan for Iraq:
1. Offer An Honest Assessment
Simply put, the Bush administration is on a course to lose in Iraq. "Losing" in Iraq means first and foremose the creation of a failed state without a functioning, stable government, one incapable of providing either nationwide security or economic well being for its people. Despite the valiant efforts of an undermanned American military, the United States appears unable to head off civil war among Shiites, Kurds and Sunnis. Worse still, Iraq may well be on a path to become a safe haven hosting bases for anti-American terrorists. President Bush's rush to war and subsequent mismanagement of the occupation is creating the very threat it claimed it sought to destroy.
2. Define Success
Over two years after the fall of Baghdad, it is no longer meaningful to speak in terms of victory in Iraq but only what can still be salvaged and what disasters avoided. The conflict against the insurgency is not about bringing democracy to Iraq or enshrining women's rights in a new constitution. The fight is not about the mythical Bush doctrine of expanding democracy throughout the Middle East.
The American fight in Iraq is now about preventing the creation of the next Afghanistan. That means some semblance of stability in Baghdad, with a government seen as legitimate. That government may well be an Islamic Republic grounded in sharia law. If the Iraqis ultimately choose that course or worse still, the option of "one man, one vote, one time", there is very little the United States can or should do about it.
These kinds of objectives represent a clear lowering of expectations. As the Washington Post reported this weekend, Bush administration officials will admit as much, just not publicly.
3. Decide: Is "Success" Still Possible?
This, of course, is the fundamental question. I believe that given the limited objectives above, "success" is still possible. It may take years, require more (and not fewer) U.S. troops in the interim, and the additional expenditure of hundreds of billions of dollars. A crippled Iraq may over time slowly defeat a tiring insurgency and redevelop its economy, all while denying Al Qaeda a refuge. Any more expansive notion of American victory, including for example western-style democratic liberties, permanent U.S. military bases, and de facto American control over the Iraqi oil industry, is fantasy.
4. Announce a Contingent Timetable for Withdrawal
Over at the Washington Monthly, Kevin Drum makes a compelling argument for announcing a timeline for American withdrawal from Iraq. Many inside and outside the administration worry about the message - and strategic advantages - to the insurgency a withdrawal deadline might sends. But there is a growing consensus that the American occupation itself is fueling the expansion and intensity of the insurgency.
An end date sufficiently in the future, say July 1, 2007, could enable the Iraqi government to split off the Sunni insurgency from Al Qaeda and other foreign Zarqawi fighters. The withdrawal target should be a contingent one: if conditions on the ground require and the Iraqi government requests, the American presence could be extended.
5. Commit the Needed Troops and Resources
From the outset of its Iraq preparations, the Bush administration has sought to fight the war on the cheap. In Janury 2003, Army General Eric Shinseki warned Congress that based on the Bosnia and Kosovo experiences, the United States would need "several hundreds of thousands" of troops to provide security in post-conflict Iraq. A February 2003 State Departmemt memo presciently warned CENTCOM about lack of planning for post-war Iraq security, stating:
"A failure to address short-term public security and humanitarian assistance concerns could result in serious human rights abuses which would undermine an otherwise successful military campaign, and our reputation internationally."
The State Department, of course, was ignored and General Shinseki forced into retirement. But everything they warned about has come to pass. Immediately after the fall of Baghdad, looting and chaos followed, due to an undermanned American military's "reluctance to take on policing roles." The result has been a growing insurgency, porous borders, and multiple U.S. offensives to repeatedly clear cities like Fallujah, Haditha and other towns along the Syrian border.
So the American people must also accept this unsettling fact: the United States will likely need to send more troops before it begin drawing down towards a 2007 deadline. Despite reassurances by President Bush and the Pentagon, the U.S. troop presence may need to increase to 250,000, with everything that entails for an already overstretched American military, to secure Iraq's borders and to give the new government time to take over the job.
6. Give Up Permanent Bases In Iraq
The United State needs to send several messages to the Iraqi people, the insurgents and to Muslims worldwide. One area where the United States must clearly signal its intentions regarding the creation of a permanent network of American military bases in Iraq. As I've written before, the presence of American troops in Muslim holy lands is one of the major grievances of Osama Bin Laden and one of the most compelling propaganda points at his disposal. The loss of U.S. bases in both Saudi Arabia and Iraq will be a blow to American force projection in the oil-rich Middle East. But permanent Iraqi bases are untenable and the American withdrawal unavoidable. There will no peace in Iraq if we try to stay.
7. Promote Transparency in the Iraqi Oil Industry
Washington must send Iraq and the world another clear message when it comes to the Iraqi oil industry. In a nutshell, Iraq will control the destiny of its oil industry. To date, American actions on this point have been suspicious at best; the first mission for U.S. troops in Baghdad was securing the Ministry of Oil. Worse still, the Bush administration made it very clear that nations which did not participate in the American-led coalition (France, Germany, Russia) would have no role in rebuilding contracts or oil concessions. The U.S. must make clear that these are Iraqi decisions, ones that could come at the expense of American oil interests and security.
8. Accept the New Constitution and Government, Come What May
The delay in the proposed Iraqi constitution doesn't necessarily mean that many of the thorniest issues will be resolved to Washington's liking. Women's rights may well be curbed. The regional division of oil revenues and a potentially federal structure for Iraq could lead to conflict and crack-up among the Kurds, Shiites and Sunnis. Some manner of sharia law, or at least prohibitions on laws that contradict Islam, is still likely.
With all of these outcomes, there is very little the United States can do. No Democrat or Republican wants to see these things come to pass, but at this late, stability and legitimacy, and not Western constitutional purity, are the best that can be hoped for. Remember that the U.S. can attribute what little progress there is to Ayatollah Sistani's 2004 insistence on and support for direct elections to produce an interim Iraqi government. If Iraq ultimately goes the route of "one man, one vote, one time", there is little in reality the United States can do about it.
9. Prioritize the Resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian Crisis
No American president should put Israel's security at risk. But the continued Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza and its seemingly endless conflict with the Palestinians, all backed by the United States, is seen as an outrage shared across the Muslim world. Bringing some semblance of peace to the region through the realization of Palestinian national aspirations must be among our highest diplomatic priorities. Sadly, President Bush, afraid to put his political capital at risk, has let the conflict fester for four and a half years. Only Yasir Arafat's fortuitous death and Ariel Sharon's unilateral Israeli withdrawal from Gaza keep Bush's supposed Road Map on life support.
10. Apologize
President Bush can never speak with credibility on Iraq and American prospects for success until he takes accountability for the errors, deceptions, misstatements and misjudgments that characterized the run up to the war.
Every aspect of the Bush administration’s war rationale has been completely and thoroughly discredited. Iraq had no role in 9/11 or meaningful linkage to Al Qaeda, as the 9/11 Commission concluded decisively. Iraq had no weapons of mass destruction, as the Iraq Survey Group’s Final (Duelfer) Report and the Robb-Silberman Commission showed definitively. Intelligence data was selectively used – and misused - to create a causus belli, as Ambassador Joseph Wilson and the Downing Street memos demonstrate so thoroughly. (And As I’ve argued in "The Myth of the Bush Doctrine", democracy promotion was merely a post facto rationalization for the war. We didn’t go to war to support democracy in Iraq; we support democracy in Iraq because we went to war there.)
President Bush, of course, will never apologize. His latest five-day swing to resell the Iraq war will feature the tired canards of the September 11/Al Qaeda link and the abominable "flypaper" theory of "fighting them there so we don't have to fight them here."
President Bush is on the slow path to further calamity in Iraq. Some of the left would speed the pace of defeat. The American people need a better choice.
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